‘Mild mannered’? Protest and mobilisation in Portugal under austerity, 2010–2013 by Accornero, G. & Pinto, P. R.
 Repositório ISCTE-IUL
 
Deposited in Repositório ISCTE-IUL:
2019-05-07
 
Deposited version:
Post-print
 
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
 
Citation for published item:
Accornero, G. & Pinto, P. R. (2015). ‘Mild mannered’? Protest and mobilisation in Portugal under
austerity, 2010–2013. West European Politics. 38 (3), 491-515
 
Further information on publisher's website:
10.1080/01402382.2014.937587
 
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Accornero, G. & Pinto, P. R. (2015). ‘Mild
mannered’? Protest and mobilisation in Portugal under austerity, 2010–2013. West European Politics.
38 (3), 491-515, which has been published in final form at
https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2014.937587. This article may be used for non-commercial
purposes in accordance with the Publisher's Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.
Use policy
Creative Commons CC BY 4.0
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in the Repository
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Serviços de Informação e Documentação, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL)
Av. das Forças Armadas, Edifício II, 1649-026 Lisboa Portugal
Phone: +(351) 217 903 024 | e-mail: administrador.repositorio@iscte-iul.pt
https://repositorio.iscte-iul.pt
	  1	  
	  
 
‘Mild Mannered’?  
Protest and Mobilisation in Portugal under austerity, 2010-
20131 
 
Guya Accornero (CIES-IUL) and Pedro Ramos Pinto (U. of 
Cambridge) 
 
 
PRE-PUBLICATION COPY – ACCEPTED FOR 
PUBLICATION WITH WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, 
JUNE 2014 
ABSTRACT:  
Anti-austerity mobilisations in Southern Europe since 2010 
have been widely debated in recent times. Commentators have 
emphasised the emergence of new political subjects such as the 
‘precariat’ organised into loose, IT-connected movements. But 
to what extent do these portrayals reflect the underlying 
dynamics of this protest cycle, and how do these movements 
interact with traditional political actors? Using Portugal as a 
case study, this article maps the cycle of anti-austerity 
contention between 2010 and 2013 to reveal a more complex 
picture, where traditional actors including labour unions and 
left-wing political parties emerge as key actors, facilitating and 
sustaining the discontinuous mobilisation of new forms of 
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activism, while seeking to gain access to new constituencies 
through them. 
Keywords: protest; social movements; labour movements; 
austerity; protest event analsys 
 
Introduction: crisis and protests in Southern Europe 
This article analyses the political consequences of the economic 
crisis and of the adoption of austerity measures on Portuguese 
citizens’ mobilisation by charting the development of 
demonstrations, strikes and other forms of collective 
contentious action between the start of 2010 and the summer of 
2013.  
In recent years, strong waves of mobilization have been felt 
through different areas of the world, from Northern Africa to, 
more recently, Brazil. A combination of various political, social 
and economic reasons, different in every country, have been at 
the root of these protests (Bartels and Bermeo 2013, Tejerina 
and Perugorría 2012b, Kriesi 2012). Surveying social protests 
between 2006 and 2013 in 87 countries encompassing 90 per 
cent of the world’s population, Ortiz et al. stress high incidence 
of contention also in European countries, mainly originating in 
the context of the 2008 financial crisis (Ortiz et al. 2013). This 
escalation of various forms of contentious politics – 
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demonstrations, occupations, popular assemblies – has been 
similarly noted by several authors (Tarrow 2011, della Porta 
2012, Campos Lima and Martins Artilles 2014). According to 
the European Social Survey’s (ESS) data for 2012, the 
percentage of people who reported participation in at least one 
demonstration grew significantly between 2008 and 2012. The 
largest increases occurred in Spain (from 15.9 to 25.9 per cent), 
in Ireland (from 6.5 to 10.5) and in Portugal (from 3.7 to 6.8).  
One feature that is often highlighted in this wave of protests is 
the role of networks of young people characterised by their 
transnational connections, use of ICT as a mobilisation tool, the 
combination of material, political and identitary demands and 
particularly the establishment of new forms of organisation, 
especially horizontal, direct or diffuse modes of decision-
making and representation – what have been called ‘new new’ 
social movements (Feixa, Pereira and Juris 2009, Fonseca 
2012, Alberich Nistal 2012). At the same time, a number of 
authors have also noted the return of a more traditional 
instrument of protest: the political strike (Campos Lima and 
Martin Artiles 2014, Gall 2013, Hamann, Johnston and Kelly 
2013, Kousis and Karakioulafi 2013, Campos Lima e Martin 
Artiles, 2011). In this emerging ecology of contention, the 
boundaries between material and economic protest are 
increasingly blurred and the objectives of different actors, such 
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as the so called ‘new new’ movements and the trade unions, 
coincide more and more.   
Southern European countries have been active participants in 
this global cycle of protest. In this region, worsening economic 
conditions, driven by the adoption of drastic austerity measures 
following sovereign debt crisis, have provided the initial 
motivation. Soon, however, economic-driven protests extended 
to a contestation of political institutions deemed unable to rise 
to the challenge, if not responsible for it in the first place. 
Across Southern European countries, trust in public institutions 
has been decreasing (Matthijs 2014), while electoral 
participation is at an historic low. Social conflict has taken 
various forms across the different countries of southern Europe: 
in Italy it has been expressed in the emergence of a new 
political party, the Five Star Movement (Bosco and Verney 
2013, Bordignon and Ceccarin 2013, Baldini 2013, Bartlett et 
al. 2013), whereas Greece experienced a fragmentation of the 
vote and violent polarisation of protest, as well as the 
appearance of direct democracy movements (Bosco and Verney 
2013, Sotirakopoulos and Sotiropoulos 2013, Kousis and 
Karakioulafi 2013).  
In Spain, the Indignados movements, especially the platform 
¡Democracia Real YA! (DRY - Real Democracy NOW!) has 
come to represent a ‘model’ for anti-austerity movements. 
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Using Twitter and Facebook, DRY eschewed party political 
references to call on ‘the unemployed, the poorly paid, the 
subcontractors, the precarious, the young people’ to take to the 
streets. After the large protests of 15 May 2011, demonstrators 
occupied streets and squares, giving way to the encampments 
(acampadas) in one of Madrid’s iconic squares. There they 
held public assemblies, which from mid-June, spread to smaller 
meetings in villages and neighbourhoods of large cities  
(Tejerina and Perugorría 2012a). 
These mobilizations have been viewed as a part of a 
transnational movement, relating them to the ‘Arab Spring’ 
(e.g. Cox, Fominaya and Shihade 2012). Other scholars have 
argued that the actual transnational coordination of protest is 
lower than in other recent movements, such as the Global 
Justice Movement (della Porta 2012: 275), and that domestic 
political contexts have shaped the implications of the global 
crisis in each country (della Porta 2012, Tarrow 2011).  
Our study builds on these observations about the importance of 
local contexts, exploring a single case in its fuller political, 
social and historical process, with the aim of situating the 
response to the broad economical crisis in the context of the 
national political opportunities and mobilization resources.  
In common with Greek, Spanish, and to an extent, Italian 
citizens, the Portuguese have suffered in this period the 
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imposition of drastic measures of fiscal contraction which, 
aside from worsening the economic situation, have deeply 
undermined what in the country are considered the ‘conquests’ 
of the 25 April 1974 revolution that ushered in Portugal’s 
democracy – a set of social rights in terms of labour law, 
healthcare and access to education. Starting from an already 
unfavourable situation – the country has long been amongst the 
poorest in Western Europe – the living conditions in austerity 
Portugal have deteriorated significantly. The litany of problems 
is depressingly familiar, and needs only a brief reminder:  GDP 
contracted in three of the five years between 2008 and 2012, 
unemployment rose from 8.6 per cent in 2008 to hit 15.3 in 
2013, reaching 37.7 for the under 25s.2 The impact of these 
measures has been particularly unequal in a country that is 
already amongst the most unequal in Europe: the largest fall in 
disposable household income has been felt in the poorest tenth 
of the population (Carmo, Cantante e Carvalho 2012).  
As in other countries, the measures that have prompted these 
developments have not gone unchallenged by civil society, and 
there has been an intensification of protest. The ESS 
participation in demonstrations data cited above is confirmed 
by figures from the Portuguese police force which show that in 
Lisbon, the capital, the frequency of demonstrations increased 
	  7	  
	  
from 244 in 2010, to 298 in 2011 and to 579 (one every 15 
hours) in 2012 (Elias and Pinho 2012: 43).  
 This increase in social conflict can be seen across all forms of 
contention, and the years between 2010 and 2013 have seen a 
multiplication of protests, from fairly ephemeral ‘media-
friendly’ actions to more low-profile but enduring conflicts, 
such as a months-long dock workers’ strikes. Some events have 
had significant media impact, as was the case of the 12 March 
2011 demonstration, when 200,000 people marched on behalf 
of Portugal’s ‘Desperate Generation’ (Geração à Rasca) - the 
name of the Facebook group and blog that was unexpectedly 
responsible for what was the largest street protest in Portugal 
since the revolutionary period of 1974-1975 (Baumgarten 2013, 
Ramos Pinto 2012). In the ensuing months, demonstrations of 
different sizes have taken place. By most accounts, the largest 
demonstration within this period occurred on 2 March 2013, 
organized by the Que se Lixe a Troika (‘Fuck the Troika’ - 
QLT) platform. However, this event also seems to have the 
peak of this cycle, and a follow-up demonstration organised by 
the QLT movement on 1 June 2013 gathered in Lisbon only a 
few hundred of people.3  
The cooling down of the frequency and intensity of protests in 
the second half of 2013 and beyond (at least until the time of 
writing of this article) marks the period between January 2010 
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and July 2013 as a cycle of protest, in Sidney Tarrow’s 
definition ‘a phase of heightened conflict and contention across 
the social system’ involving, among others features, ‘a rapid 
diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less 
mobilized sector’ (Tarrow 1998: 42). Protest cycles feature 
elements such as the emergence of new groups, the 
mobilization of new actors, innovation in the repertoires of 
action, and the elaboration of new cognitive, cultural and 
ideological frames – features we can observe in the Portuguese 
case.  
 The Portuguese ‘austerity cycle of protest’ is only now 
beginning to be analysed in earnest. Baumgarten’s field study 
offers us invaluable insights into the internal dynamics of the 
new social movement organisations that have appeared in this 
period, as well as the working of their internal identitary and 
democratic processes (Baumgarten 2013). Estanque, Costa and 
Soeiro, building on Sousa Santos, emphasize the connection of 
these emerging domestic protests with global protest 
movements in terms of emotional activation (Estanque, Costa 
and Soeiro 2013, Sousa Santos 2011). Our work differs from 
this to the extent that we look to shift the focus away from 
these social movements and networks in and of themselves, and 
instead try to analyse them as part of a broader cycle of 
contention, and in relation to other social and political actors. 
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Our aim is to test the claims about the reach, scope and impact 
of these mobilisations on the field of contention as a whole, and 
in relation to traditions and existing modes of social 
mobilisation in contemporary Portugal.  
In order to do this we have constructed a database of protest 
events in Portugal between January 2010 and July 2013. Using 
a Protest Event Analysis (PEA) methodological framework, we 
sampled three weekly issues of the online platform of the daily 
national newspaper Diário de Notícias, which includes the 
newspaper’s news, as well as agency material from the 
Portuguese news agency Lusa, sampling the Monday, 
Wednesday and Friday issues of the newspaper between 1 
January 2010 and 31 July 2013. We established a number of 
criteria for selection of the news items to include reports on any 
form of ‘contentious’ claim-making: that is, interaction 
between collective actors taking place outside established 
channels of representation and exchange (such as elections, 
parliamentary debates, ‘concertation’ meetings or other forms 
of ‘ordinary’ political interaction). The resulting episodes of 
contention were coded according to primary actor (who was 
responsible for the contentions episode), the claim or issue at 
stake, the primary target of the action, the type of action (e.g. 
demonstration, occupation, petition or strike), as well as 
number of other characteristics of the action, if available: place, 
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numbers involved, duration and whether or not violence had 
taken place.4 The database covers protest events in multiple 
dates as long as they are reported in the dates sampled. While 
not able to provide a day-by-day account of protest events, this 
allows us to elicit changes in the frequency and repertoires of 
protest and the role played by different categories of actors. 
The central part of our study is thus the evolution of political 
contention in Portugal between January 2010 and June 2013, 
the period that precedes and follows the Portuguese bailout by 
the IMF-EU-ECB troika in May 2011.  
 
Portuguese civil society activism in historical context: the 
‘mild-mannered’ disaffected 
The appearance of a seemingly sustained cycle of extra-
parliamentary protest in Portugal has to be understood in the 
context of a still-prevalent tendency in the scholarship to see 
the country’s public sphere as relatively acquiescent. Influential 
studies on the political attitudes and participation of Portuguese 
citizens have argued that the country is characterised by 
comparatively low levels of political involvement, (Freire 
2000, Freire and Magalhães, 2003, Freire 2003, Magalhães 
2005). This portrayal has to be qualified by a longer view – 
Portuguese civil society has, at times, mobilised forcefully and, 
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as Fishman argues, Portugal’s political system has been more 
open to mobilisation and non-conventional forms of claim-
making than other Southern European countries, on account of 
the nature of its transition to democracy (Fishman 2011).5 
Portuguese democracy was forged in an atmosphere of 
heightened mobilisation. The Portuguese revolutionary period 
(the nineteen months that followed the removal of the 
dictatorship by a military coup in 25 April 1974) was 
characterised by almost daily demonstrations, public meetings, 
strikes and other forms of unconventional political activity that 
included the occupation of houses, firms and agricultural land, 
when high levels of voter turnout also characterized this period 
(Accornero 2013, Ramos Pinto 2013, Palacios Cerezales 2003, 
Bermeo 1997,).  
Although at a lower level of intensity than during the 
revolutionary period, protest and social mobilisation persisted 
through the years of austerity that preceded Portugal’s entry to 
the European Economic Community in 1986. During this 
period the country was forced to resort to IMF bailouts in 1978 
and 1983, and witnessed its first general strike since 1934 in 
1982. Data on contention in Portugal for the years 1980-1995 
shows that high levels of labour mobilisation characterised the 
first two decades of Portuguese democracy, reaching a peak in 
1982, another year of economic crisis, preceding the second 
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IMF bailout in only five years. After a period of relative quiet, 
frequent protests returned (albeit at a lower level) between 
1988 and 1989, in opposition to the market-oriented liberalising 
reforms of the second Partido Social Democrata (Social 
Democratic Party, PSD, centre-right) government under 
Cavaco Silva.6  
Since then, the picture has changed somewhat. After the mid-
1990s, the availability of data on various types of protest is 
more fragmented, but the evidence suggests that 1995 closed a 
cycle of contention and opened a period of relative quiet. In the 
field of labour protest, with the Portuguese economy buoyed by 
membership of the European Economic Community, labour 
conflicts entered a decade of progressive decline (Figure 6).7 
There were no general strikes during the 1990s, and only two 
were called in the decade following the millennium (Table 2). 
Charting the evolution of non-labour contention using protest 
events analysis for the years 1992-2002, Mendes and Seixas 
noted a tendency towards a decrease for the average number of 
participants in protests: while the number of contentious events 
increased, these tended to attract fewer participants, and be 
marked by more ‘spectacular and radical’ actions (Mendes and 
Seixas 2005: 119-120).  
In addition, the findings of more recent participation studies do 
show decreasing levels of engagement with politics and trust in 
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political institutions, showing that if the picture of a passive 
civil society is not necessarily true for the whole of Portugal’s 
democratic period, it is coming to characterise the last two 
decades (Magalhães 2005, Magalhães 2009, Costa Pinto et al. 
2012). In a 2005 study Magalhães identified a sense of 
‘democratic disaffection’, noting the distance of Portuguese 
citizens from political institutions and showing that, even if 
support for democracy is solid, there was a strong sense of 
disaffection expressed in low levels of political participation 
and engagement, conventional and otherwise (Magalhães 2005: 
988).  
This increasing distance from institutions reveals itself in 
different ways. One is decreasing participation in elections. 
Already in 2002, Freire and Magalhães highlighted that ‘while 
in the 1970s Portugal was one of the Western nations without 
compulsory voting were turnout was higher, turnout today is 
already below the average for the West European democracies 
without compulsory voting, in what represents the sharpest 
decline among OECD countries’ (Freire and Magalhães 2002: 
47–50). In the intervening decade since their study, the 
situation has not improved: while a slight rise can be seen in the 
proportion of those resident in Portugal voting, the return of a 
pattern of emigration continues to depress voting turnout (see 
Table 1). 
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While there are no systematic comparisons of participation and 
incidence of contentious political mobilisation, a preliminary 
analysis suggests that, in the period 1989-1995, Portugal 
showed a drastically lower level of participation in protest 
activities than Greece (Accornero 2012). Rejecting ‘fatalistic’ 
and ‘culturalist’ explanations for these patterns of participation, 
recent scholarship has emphasised the importance of a shortfall 
in levels of education in depressing participation, generating 
‘political alienation’ and feelings of ‘distance to power’ 
(Villaverde Cabral 1997 and 2000; Freire 2000). One of the 
pernicious legacies of authoritarianism was a chronic shortfall 
in education: among the 15 countries that composed the 
European Union in 2002, Portugal had, by far, the lowest 
percentage of the population in the 25-64 age group who had 
completed secondary education (21 per cent).  
 
Protest and austerity in Portugal since 2010 
In summary, it is clear that Portuguese civil society has been far 
from static over the past four decades. Periods of intense 
mobilisation have punctuated a gradual erosion of the weight 
and role of traditional forms of political participation. How do 
the anti-austerity mobilisations of the 2010-2013 fit into this 
pattern?  
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The data collated for this study, summarised in Figure 1, 
reveals an evolving protest cycle with a number of peaks and 
troughs. The first half of 2010 sees a concentration of protest 
events that coincides with the shockwaves of the global 
economic crisis hitting Portugal. By the beginning of the year, 
the Socialist minority government was forced to admit that 
significant budget cuts would be necessary in order to meet the 
Eurozone’s deficit target. Pay freezes and other deflationary 
measures were strongly contested by multiple actors, with the 
most high profile actions being a public sector strike in early 
March and the organisation of simultaneous nationwide 
demonstrations by the trade union CGTP (Confederação Geral 
dos Trabalhadores Portugueses,	  General Confederation of the 
Portuguese Workers) in early July. A second peak can be found 
around the time of the resignation of the Socialist government 
under worsening economic conditions. Following the general 
strike of November 2010, the incidence of protest events grows 
markedly, culminating in the large Geração à Rasca 
demonstration of 12 March 2011. On 22 March 2011, the 
socialist government saw its proposals for restricting public 
spending and limiting the growth of the budget deficit defeated 
in Parliament.  
 The rejection of the government’s plans made external 
intervention inevitable, and the government’s position 
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untenable.  It duly resigned 10 days later and began 
negotiations for a rescue package with the EC-ECB-IMF 
troika. The 78 billion Euro bailout was agreed by May, 
immediately before the June 2011 elections which saw the 
appointment of a coalition government formed by the centre-
right PSD (Partido Social Democrático - Social Democratic 
Party) and the right-wing PP (Partido Popular – Popular 
Party). While public spending cuts had begun under the 
Socialist government, the most hard-hitting measures have been 
applied since its resignation, as the bailout conditions required 
painful cuts to salaries, pensions, benefits and the public 
services, as well as steep tax increases (de Sousa et al 2014). 
These measures have had a significant effect on the financial 
security of many in the country, with knock-on effects on 
consumption, and through that on employment, creating what 
feels to many as a vicious circle (Castro Caldas 2012).   
After the 2011 legislative elections, two more peaks of protest 
emerged: in the second half of 2012, and more recently, 
between March and June 2013.  Both of these were marked by 
some of the largest public demonstrations recorded in 
Portuguese history, on 15 September 2012 and in 2 March 
2013. Both were organised by the social movement Que se Lixe 
a Troika – exactly the kind of the ‘new politics’ that 
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commentators have argued we are beginning to see emerging 
across different polities, not only in Europe, but also elsewhere. 
As showed by this brief account, the growing pattern of 
contention through late 2010 and early 2011 should be seen in 
the context of the political crisis caused by government’s 
response to the financial crash, and the increasing division 
between political elites8 in respect to the solutions for the 
country’s financial situation. This created an opportunity for a 
number of constituencies (old and new) to inset claims into the 
fractures among institutional actors, contributing to transform 
what were scattered events into a cycle of protest. Seen in this 
light, this cycle started to wane only from the spring of 2013 
onwards, in the face of a renewed cohesion of the mainstream 
parties around the politics of austerity, and the failure of the 
protest movement in converting street protests into a wider 
challenge to the system.  
This broad overview based on event counts alone cannot give 
us a complete picture of a complex cycle of contention. 
Measuring the weight of different protests in terms of 
participation is notoriously difficult, and is not reflected in pure 
event counts. For instance, four of the five general strikes seen 
in Portugal in this period, which mobilised many thousands of 
citizens, appear in months where the sample shows relatively 
small numbers of protest events. A more nuanced picture can 
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be gleaned from an analysis of forms of action used, and the 
categories of actors who were reported as leading or initiating 
the protest events in the database. This shows that the cycle of 
protest did not finish without partially changing the landscape 
of political opposition, with the affirmation of new political 
actors and the consolidation of new alliances. 
Our analysis highlights two clear patterns: that a shift in the 
kind of protest used is observable between early 2010 and 
2013, and that, contrary to the emphasis on ‘new new’ 
movements, labour has remained throughout the most 
significant protest actor, even if it has been forced to look for 
new allies beyond its traditional constituencies. 
Firstly, the sample reveals overwhelming predominance of 
labour-initiated protest. Despite the focus by the Portuguese 
and international media on new actors, particularly the 
supposed centrality of labour market outsiders to anti-austerity 
protests, our sample shows that ‘traditional’ labour 
organisations are still at the forefront of protest in Portugal. 
Across the period, 78 protest events (47.9 per cent of the total) 
were initiated by public sector trade unions, to which we can 
add the further eleven organised by national trade union 
federations such as the CGTP or UGT (União Geral de 
Trabalhadores, General Union of Workers), and the 19 led by 
workers in the private sector. Overall, two-thirds of protests 
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(66.3 per cent) in the sample arose from the world of work and 
workers representative organisations (Figure 4). In contrast, 
political groups such as QLT, M12M or Geração à Rasca 
appear as the lead actors in only 19 events (11.7 per cent), 
barely more than in protests organised by users and consumers 
of public and private services (15 events). 
A second notable feature is that the sample shows strikes and 
demonstrations appearing in different cycles. These forms of 
action overshadow all others in the sample: 66 of the 163 
events listed are demonstrations (40.5 per cent) and 76 strikes 
of various durations and scope (46.6 per cent). Other types of 
action, including petitions, public assemblies and occupations 
characterise primarily only 12.9 per cent of protest events. But 
the way in which they are distributed through our period differs 
– strikes are concentrated in two peaks of protest that preceded 
the 2011 election (Figure 3). After that their frequency 
diminishes to emerge once again, although with slightly lower 
intensity, in the last 6 months.  Demonstrations on the other 
hand, become more common in the periods of contestation in 
mid to late 2012 and since March 2013 (Figure 2). 
 
Mobilising against the austerity: Labour and ‘New New’ Social 
Movements 
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The connection between these two findings – the role of labour, 
and the increasing number of demonstrations - can be made 
clearer by charting the political evolution over the two and half 
years in question. From this we argue that throughout the 
period, the public sector and its unions have become 
increasingly central in contesting the government’s austerity 
programme. In addition, protest became increasingly 
coordinated as the two main trade union federations began to 
agglomerate what had begun as more isolated protests by sector 
or company-level unions. Accompanying this evolution, a 
number of ‘new new’ social movements have emerged, but it is 
not clear that they have been able to sustain high levels of 
mobilisation when not supported by union action. However, 
while their capacity to mobilise large numbers of supporters 
remains limited, in recent times these movements seem to have 
adapted to use high-visibility protest actions (demonstrations) 
by small groups of activists as a means to gather media 
attention and drive their campaigns forward. 
At the beginning of the period sampled, during the first wave of 
protest (the first half of 2010), over a third of labour-based 
protest originated in the private sector, notably over pay and 
layoffs (Figure 5). Over the remainder of the period, the 
incidence of private sector labour conflict diminishes, and 
public sector workers and trade union federations take a leading 
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role in protest. Official data on the pattern of strike action in 
Portugal seems to confirm this trend, although figures for 2013 
are not yet available: the number of work days lost to strikes 
has been on the increase since 2010, as is the rate of strike 
participation as measured by official statistics. In addition, the 
incidence of strikes across multiple companies (a sign of 
coordination) has increased, from 18.6 per cent of strike events 
in 2010, it was a feature in 39.7 percent in 2011 and 28.3 in 
2012.9 The increase in coordination of protest by labour is 
evident in the growing use of the general strike as a tactic: 
during the first 35 years of democracy (1974-2009), Portuguese 
trade union federations called general strikes on five occasions 
(See Table 2). Since 2010, however, a similar number has taken 
place in only three years. This development has been facilitated 
by an increasing collaboration between the two main trade 
union federations, traditionally rivals rather than allies. In fact, 
only once in the previous three decades had both trade union 
federations joined forces in supporting a general strike. The 
CGTP and the União Geral dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ 
General Union – UGT) have long represented different political 
leanings of Portuguese labour, with the CGTP working closely 
with the PCP, and the UGT more in line with the Socialist 
Party. This link to one of the two ruling parties means that in 
the past the UGT has been more willing to negotiate with 
government (Royo 2002: 94-5). Yet, since 2010, the 
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federations have put their differences aside on three occasions, 
most recently in June 2013. In this the UGT seems at times to 
have been pushed by its membership: when it decided not to 
support the November 2012 general strike, 23 of its 49 
affiliated unions (including 6 large public sector unions) 
decided to join the strike nonetheless.10 Whether or not this 
growing coordination of the labour movement has been 
accompanied by a strengthening of its capacity for mobilisation 
is, however, a question for which we do not yet have an 
answer. It is difficult to estimate the impact and scope of each 
of these general strikes, and available data on union affiliation, 
while it shows a steady decline in trade union density rates, is 
only available until 2010.11  
What is clear is that new organisations have appeared on the 
field of protest, and have been particularly active since the 
summer of 2011. Movements such as Geração à Rasca and 
Que se Lixe a Troika have been the focus of media attention, 
which identifies them as a new form of civic and political 
engagement and as the principal civil society response to 
austerity measures.  
The first of these movements to appear – Geração à Rasca – 
predates even the Spanish Indignados. The manner and speed 
through which this movement emerged is indeed testament to 
the role of ICTs in supporting mobilisation: the demonstration 
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was called by three friends who started a Facebook group and 
blog after being inspired by a popular song by the Portuguese 
band Deolinda, Parva que sou (‘How dumb I am’), whose 
lyrics express the anxieties caused by the lack of job security 
and prospects of Portuguese twenty-somethings.12 As 
Baumgarten has suggested, despite references to international 
movements and themes that included the Arab Spring of 2010, 
the focus and key references of this emerging movement were 
principally national (Baumgarten 2013: 465-466). This is clear 
in its name, Geração à Rasca, a reference a 1990 student 
mobilisation, the so-called Geração Rasca - ‘Trashy 
Generation’ (Seixas 2005).  
Ostensibly non-partisan, even anti-political in the sense of a 
rejection of established political parties, the 12 March Geração 
à Rasca demonstration was a success. However, after these 
auspicious beginnings, the ability of ‘new new’ social 
movements to sustain mobilisation has been mixed: if in some 
instances they have been able to mobilise in very large 
numbers, being responsible for some of the largest 
demonstrations since the Revolution; in between these events 
they have been less successful at maintaining significant levels 
of participation in other demonstrations, public assemblies and 
other initiatives.  
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A number of organizations and movements appeared after 
March 2011, as smaller protest organisations coalesced and 
created alliances. The following month, the organizers of the 
Geração à Rasca demonstration created the platform M12M: 
Movimento 12 de Março (‘12 March Movement’). Again 
emphasizing its non-partisan, neither right not left position, and 
eschewing any programmatic positions, the movement invoked 
Portugal’s Nobel prize in literature, José Saramago, in their aim 
‘to make every citizen a politician’. By the summer of 2011 
they joined other groups - many recent offshoots of global 
networks such as Indignados Lisboa, Acampada Lisboa – 
Democracia Veradeira Já, Portugal Uncut, or ATTAC Portugal 
- to create the 15-O Platform, coordinating with similar 
organisations across the world to stage the international 
demonstration on 15 October 2011. This was also a significant 
protest, if considerably smaller than the March 2011 events.13  
Through the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012 there were 
signs of the anti-austerity movements splitting along the 
traditional divisions on the left, caught between the rivalry 
between the PCP and the Bloco de Esquerda. After the March 
2012 the secretary-general of the CGTP, Arménio Carlos 
accused the 15-O of having provoked clashes with the police 
during the strike, a tactic he believed distracted attention from 
the real issues and allowed the police to stoke up a climate of 
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fear, and suggested instead that the CGTP only recognised a 
different anti-austerity organisation, the Precários Inflexíveis 
(‘Inflexible short-term contract workers’ – PI). However, 
among other players, collaborations had already begun 
developing, with several ‘new new’ movements engaging with 
established political actors in initiatives such as the creation of 
a ‘Citizen Audit on Sovereign Debt’ (Auditoria Cidadã à 
Dívida Pública) aimed at promoting debate around debt 
restructuration or even its cancellation, whose organizing 
committee included a former secretary general of the CGTP 
union federation and a former socialist junior minister, amongst 
others.14  
 This tendency towards greater collaboration was evident in 
October 2012, when the leaders of the M12M joined others 
close to the CGTP and the left-wing party Bloco de Esquerda 
in organising a ‘Democratic Congress for Alternatives’ 
(Congresso Democratico das Alternativas – CDA). Despite 
drawing criticism from both the Communist Party and the UGT 
union federation, the Congress brought together around 1,500 
people aiming to create a common platform unifying the 
various movements and groups fighting against austerity.15  
The CDA, together with other groups and organisations, 
supported a further demonstration-organising platform: Que se 
Lixe a Troika. Queremos as Nossas Vidas de Volta (‘Fuck the 
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Troika: we Want our Lives Back!’ – QLT). As with M12M and 
15O, the QLT has defined itself as non-partisan in its slogans, 
communiqués and publicity. The terms right or left are barely 
mentioned, and there are many expressions of independence. 
Nevertheless, its positioning is evident, if only because of the 
pattern of alliances it has established with left-wing parties 
(PCP and Bloco de Esquerda) and with the trade union 
federation CGTP.16 Despite its earlier suspicions over the CDA, 
and having often publicly criticised the ‘new new’ movements 
(most recently in a highly sceptical editorial of its members’ 
newspapers), it seems that the PCP changed strategy in 2012, 
and opted for a closer collaboration with the non-aligned anti-
austerity protests.17 One newspaper reported that the QLT 
organising committee included several leading PCP members, 
alongside other BE leaders.18 Although this does not mean that 
the QLT is a ‘front organisation’, it does show that since 2012 
there has been a significant degree of coordination between 
‘old old’ and ‘new new’ politics: a few days after the 
demonstration of 15 September, the QLT organizers called on 
its supporters to attend a demonstration convened by the CGTP 
on 29 September 2012, while the CGTP supported the QLT’s 2 
March 2013, demonstration, which once again was said to have 
broken participation records. And once more, alongside the 
decidedly ‘internationalist’ feel and claims of the organisers, 
the historic symbols of protest and democracy the country are 
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recurrently used by the QLT, as is the case with the song 
Grândola, Vila Morena, symbolic of the 1974-5 Revolution.19  
Concluding reflections 
Looking across the two and a half years since the start of 2010, 
we can therefore see an evolving and shifting pattern of 
contention, but one where multiple forms of mobilisation of 
civil society interact, build alliances and adapt strategies. We 
do not see a ‘mild mannered’, quiescent response to austerity. 
Despite the continued significant inequalities in political 
resources that depress participation in Portugal when compared 
to other western nations, we can also say that the capacity for 
mobilisation of Portuguese civil society is not fixed by what 
could be called ‘supply-side’ factors (the characteristics of the 
population), but also responds to contexts and opportunities. In 
this case the opening for mobilisation was the weakening and 
the delegitimisation of the PS government, and the combination 
of the subsequent electoral campaign with the negotiations for 
an external bailout. The results of the 2011 elections, which 
brought to power a coalition committed to the politics of 
austerity offered fewer opportunities for a stronger push from 
both new and traditional challengers, but encouraged the 
attempts to form alliances between them. These dynamics 
remind us that, as Tarrow noted, ‘while the financial crisis 
sparked a great deal of contention, it was differently affected by 
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the political opportunity structure of each country’ (Tarrow 
2011: 27). 
Yet, even if our findings are necessarily tentative, aiming as 
they do at a moving target, some broader preliminary 
conclusions are possible. First, that in assessing the current 
cycle of protest in European democracies we need to consider 
the limits of ‘new new’ movements, as much as their potential. 
Second, our analysis of the Portuguese case suggests that 
traditional – ‘old old’ – actors seem to retain a central role in 
extraordinary political mobilisation. Yet, we also note that 
unions and left-wing parties are acting from a position of 
weakness, drawing on highly depleted constituencies. Taken 
together, the limitations of both ‘old old’ and ‘new new’ in fact 
suggest that the road ahead for such actors lies not in 
competition, but in cooperation – something we see developing 
in the Portuguese case.  
The new social movements we charted in relation to the 
broader field of anti-austerity politics in Portugal certainly do 
evidence many interesting and novel characteristics: their mode 
of mobilisation does rely extensively on ICT; their discourse 
makes original identity claims based on traditionally silent 
vectors (informal or insecure employment, the idea of a 
‘generation’); and they do advocate, in many cases, non-
hierarchical forms of mobilisation and participation. On the 
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other hand, our data suggests that these movements’ ability to 
mobilise extensively has been sporadic and discontinuous. In 
part this may be connected to the relative absence a long-
established autonomous infra-structure of civil society –
Portuguese ‘new new’ social movements have a relatively 
sparse network of autonomous social justice and campaigning 
social movement organisations to draw support, expertise and 
members from. As such these movements may be less rooted in 
their constituency than is often suggested. As work on Russian 
opposition networks has argued (Beissinger 2013), IT 
connected movements – ‘virtual civil society’ – which are not 
embedded in consolidated forms of association – ‘conventional 
civil society’ – increases their volatility. As a result, these new 
anti-austerity movements have adapted their tactics and 
repertoires, moving away from large demonstrations towards 
high-profile, highly-visible actions by small numbers of 
activists, such as the disruption public appearances by 
government ministers. But more importantly, our evidence 
suggests that, especially in 2012 and 2013, they have 
increasingly relied on alliances with political parties and in 
particular trade unions for major actions, and they appear to be 
less likely to mobilise extensively when not backed by such 
established actors. 
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In contrast, in terms of sustained mobilisation, the politics of 
labour have not diminished in importance: even if mass 
demonstrations under the anti-austerity ‘generation’ or 
‘precariat’ banners have attracted most media attention, the 
most important component of the mobilisations between 2010-
2013 have been the ‘traditional’ forms of protest and, foremost 
amongst them that classic weapon, the general strike. The early 
signs are that there has been a relative strengthening of the 
mobilising capacity and political influence of labour unions in 
Portugal, even if membership and strike action are still below 
the levels seen in the cycle of contention of the 1980s and 
1990s. 
As we saw, our analysis echoes very recent work on other 
European polities that questions the death of the ‘old old’ 
political actors and issues in the current cycle of protest 
(Wahlström, Wennerhag and Peterson 2013, Bosi and della 
Porta 2013, Rüdig and Karyotis 2013). Some authors have also 
underlined that there has been a significant increase in the 
number of public sector and general strikes in several European 
countries (Hamann, Johnston and Kelly 2013 and Gall 2013). 
Moreover, Gall considers that since the late 2000s, ‘political 
mass strike’ is now ‘the mainstay in the repertoires of 
contention of union movements in France, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain since the late 1990s’ (Gall 2013: 685).  
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Our findings warrant a final reflection on a critical issue: what 
could be the actual political and social consequences of this 
cycle of mobilisation? Time will tell, but we would emphasise 
two aspects: it is evident that neither the massive 
demonstrations, nor the multiplication of the general strikes, 
nor the months-long strong strike of the dock-workers seem to 
have had much effect in reversing the application of austerity 
measures. The weapons of anti-austerity mobilisation are, at 
first sight, blunt. Yet, intriguing synergies have emerged from 
the participation of these two types of actor in anti-austerity 
protests in Portugal.  
There is, as of yet, limited data available on the values and 
practices of those who take part in these acts of protest, and 
relatively little can be said on whether participation in this 
cycle of contention has changed political attitudes and 
affiliations. ESS results for the 2010 and 2012 waves, however, 
suggest that such mobilisations have made some inroads in 
attracting those who have not felt represented by institutional 
politics. While membership of political parties has remained 
low in European terms, since 2010 there have been increases in 
the proportion of respondents stating having signed petitions or, 
particularly, attending demonstrations, an indicator where the 
Portuguese reached the European average for the first time in a 
decade (de Sousa et al 2014: 18). Overall, the proportion of 
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respondents stating participation in a public demonstration in 
the previous year more than doubled, from 2.4 per cent in 2010 
to 6.8 in 2012. While there was, as is to be expected, a strong 
representation of supporters of the more oppositionist left-wing 
parties (the PCP and, mainly, the BE), it is also notable that the 
number of those who protested but report no sympathy for any 
given political party increased from 36.4 in 2010 to 49.6 per 
cent, and a similar pattern is observable amongst those who 
have never belonged to a trade union. Clearly, the wider scope 
and diversity of the protests in this cycle have grown to 
encompass at least some of Portugal’s ‘disaffected democrats’. 
The same ESS data shows that almost two thirds of those who 
participated in demonstrations in 2012 had voted in 2011, as 
opposed to less than half of those who had not attended one. It 
is not out of the question that such kinds of unconventional 
participation could be a route towards ‘mainstream’ 
participation, although in a transformed political space. This 
finding confirms that contentious forms of politics are not 
always in contrast with institutional participation and that 
cycles of protests might led to an increasing participation both 
in conventional and non conventional channels (Tarrow 1989, 
McAdam 1998, Cerezales 2003).  
Moreover, even if the direct consequences of the cycle of 
protest analysed in this article are hard to measure and the 
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policies of austerity continue, mobilization did introduce 
modifications in the political landscape. New political actors 
emerged, as was the case with the Congresso Democratico das 
Alternativas, from which two more organizations were born: 
the platform 3D (Dignity, Democract and Development) and 
the new left-wing party Livre. If on the one hand this 
multiplication of political parties at the left end of the spectrum 
runs the risk of compromising some of its parts, such as the 
Bloco de Esquerda, overall, there seems to be an increase in the 
vote in political parties on the left, who have been the main 
beneficiaries of shifting electoral preferences. The PCP, which 
as we have seen changed towards a strategy of alliance building 
across the unions and new movements, has steadily made gains, 
winning 11 per cent of the vote in the local elections of 2013, 
its best result since 1997. The 2014 European elections saw the 
range of parties to the left of the PS win an unprecedented 29.9 
per cent share of the vote.20 The main opposition party, PS, 
seems not to have been able to capitalize on these dynamics, 
even if together with governing centre-right coalition it 
continues to hold a (diminished) majority of votes cast.  
While a direct link between the cycle of protest and electoral 
results cannot be established, in other areas we can clearly 
identify some effects. Aside from the re-emergence of labour 
protest, the mobilisation of  ‘new new’ social movements has  
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had an undeniable influence on the trade unions – they have 
been led to negotiate, coordinate with and in many cases 
participate in emerging constellation of new organisation 
seeking to represent new constituencies. If sustained and 
developed, such collaborations, forcing traditional political 
actors to reach out to new constituencies – labour market 
‘outsiders’ and the young, for instance –, and new movements 
to form alliances with institutionally established pressure 
groups, have the potential to radically transform the political 
map. This is particularly the case if these encounters turn out to 
be mutually reinforcing, as Campos Lima and Martin Artiles 
have argued (Campos Lima and Martin Artiles 2014: 142), a 
process apparent in Greece, where Kousis and Karakioulafi 
found both diverse movements coalescing into 
‘meganetworks’, a process perhaps in development in Portugal 
following an earlier period of competition between them 
(2013).  
It is therefore in the beginnings of a collaboration between 
broad-based anti-austerity movements and the traditional actors 
of the left that we see the possibility of developments that may 
impact the nature of Southern European politics in the medium-
term. 
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1 We are grateful to several colleagues for their helpful advice. In particular 
we would like to thank John Karamichas, Irene Martín, Tiago Carvalho, 
Robert Fishman, Leonardo Morlino, Goffredo Adinolfi, Marco Lisi e Rui 
Branco. 
2 Source: EUROSTAT: Labour Force Survey. 
3 2,500-3,000 demonstrators according the organizers and approximately 
1,000 according to the chief of the Polícia de Segurança Pública (Public 
Security Police, PSP). Source: Público, 2 June 2013. 
4 Our methodology draws on both the PEA and ‘Contentious Politics’ 
approach, combining the systematic coding of newspaper events with 
content analysis of the same, as well as broader contextual sweep of 
available materials, seeking to map the field of contention, rather than 
focusing on single actor. See: Earl et al 2004  Koopmans and Statham 1999, 
Tilly and Tarrow 2007. 
5  In respect to the effects of a revolutionary transition on the development 
of Portuguese civil society see also Fernandes (2014). 
6 Data from the European Protest and Coercion Database (EPCD), retrieved 
from  http://web.ku.edu/~ronfrand/data/ 
7 Unlike the EPCD data, which draws on news sources, Figure 6 draws on 
governmental statistics drawing on legal notices of strike action, which 
results in the reporting of a much wider range of actions. As a result of 
different methods of collection the two series cannot be combined, but they 
show roughly comparable fluctuations. 
8 Political elites divisions are frequently at the origin of an opening in the 
Political Opportunity Structure, which can ‘provide incentives for people to 
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undertake collective action by affecting their expectations of success or 
failure’ (Tarrow 1996: 54).	  
9 Data from Estatísticas em Síntese - Greves. Gabinete de Estratégia e 
Estudos, Ministério da Economia e Emprego, 2010, 2011 and 2012. The 
2010 figure seems to be the continuation of a pattern, with the proportion of 
multiple company strikes similar to those observed in 2005, 2006 and 2007 
– the closests years for which data is available. 
10 http://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/23-sindicatos-da-ugt-emitem-
preavisos-de-greve--1572243  
11 According to the ICTWSS Database, reported union density rates have 
steadily fallen from 60.8 in 1978 to 19.3 in 2010: Jelle Visser, ICTWSS 
database (Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
Intervention and Social Pacts, 1960-2010), version 4.0: http://www.uva-
aias.net/208  
12 http://www.publico.pt/sociedade/noticia/um-desempregado-um-bolseiro-
e-uma-estagiaria-inventaram-o-protesto-da-geracao-a-rasca-1482270  
13 http://www.publico.pt/politica/noticia/stop-troika-e-passos-ladrao-
comandaram-a-revolucao-dos-indignados-1516693#/0  
14 http://www.auditoriacidada.info/. 
15 http://www.congressoalternativas.org/  
 
17 http://www.omilitante.pcp.pt/pt/324/Tema/797/  
18 http://www.ionline.pt/artigos/outros/se-lixe-troika-nucleo-duro-dominado-
militantes-be-pcp 
 
20 We included, in this figure, the 7,15% of votes obtained by the MPT 
(Partido da Terra,  Earth Party) even if its location on the left-right axis is 
still quite problematic. 	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Tab. 1 Abstention index in Portugal 
 
Year Total Residents in 
Portugal 
Not Residents 
in Portugal 
1975 8,5 8,3 36,8 
1980 15,2 14,6 39,5 
1983 22,2 21,4 54,6 
1985 25,7 24,6 70 
1987 28,5 27,4 73,5 
1991 32,6 31,8 67,4 
1995 33,8 32,9 76,2 
1999 39 38,2 76,5 
2002 38,4 37,7 75,6 
2005 35,6 35 75,3 
2009 40,3 39,5 84,7 
2011 41,9 41,1 83,1 
Source: PORDATA 
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Tab. 2 General Strikes in Portugal since 1975: 
Date Organiser 
1982 (12 February) CGTP 
1982 (11 May) CGTP 
1988 (28 March) CGTP and UGT 
2002 (10 December) CGTP 
2007 (30 May) CGTP 
2010 (24 November) CGTP and UGT 
2011 (24 November) CGTP and UGT 
2012 (22 March) CGTP 
2012 (14 November) CGTP  
2013 (27 June) CGTP and UGT 
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